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Consultation responses from the SRA

SRA response to - Legal Services Consumer Panel call for evidence

Published on 10 March 2010

Introduction

1. The Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) added its support to a cross sector review of the use of referral arrangements in the context of legal services in early 2009 and warmly welcomes the investigation by the Legal Services Consumer Panel (LSCP). The SRA is keen to continue to work with the Legal Services Board (LSB) and the LSCP in advancing matters.

2. The LSCP is asked to note the position of the SRA set out by the SRA Board in December 2008. The Board concluded that a return to a ban on solicitors paying referral fees was not appropriate but that a cross sector review of the issue should be supported. Whilst this submission provides input at staff level, the SRA would welcome an early indication of any recommendations in order that it may give further consideration to the issues at Committee / Board level.

3. The SRA has focused upon topics (a) and (b) set out by the LSCP in the Key Areas for Investigation, but has aimed to address the wider issues also.

Submissions

Key area of investigation a) demonstrable positive and negative outcomes for consumers due to referral arrangements, such as the impact on access to justice, consumer choice of lawyer, quality of legal advice and independence of legal advice.

Areas where further evidence is required

4. The SRA is pleased to note the emphasis on demonstrable outcomes. Referrals of business undoubtedly give rise to both profits and outlay in the millions. The potential for understandable bias on the part of stakeholders in advancing arguments on the topic, however, should not be underestimated. In order to be certain of the impact of referral arrangements upon consumers, it is perhaps worth scrutinising closely some of the arguments made.

That referral fees increase the fees charged to consumers by lawyers

5. Whilst this is commonly advanced as a statement of fact¹ in the context of civil litigation, it does appear to be inconsistent with the procedures for charging and recovering costs in law. In personal injury cases, for example, the payment for a referral of a claimant client to a firm cannot be recovered from an opponent and a firm would not charge such overheads to the client in any event. Defendants have great success in reducing claims for personal injury costs² either by negotiating to the effect that specific items of a costs bill are unreasonable or by proceeding to Court for a detailed assessment. This is perhaps not surprising. In the vast majority of cases the Courts are required to resolve any doubts "which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party"³. If the costs claimed can be justified in law (and it is clear that referral fees would not be so justified), with the option for a detailed assessment and with any discrepancies being resolved in the paying party's favour, then it would seem that there can be no meaningful evidence that referral fees have increased the costs in individual cases.

6. The assumption appears to be that referral fees cut into profits which may motivate firms to, for example, issue court proceedings to increase costs and recoup their outlay. However, a degree of financial incentive on the part of any service provider is inevitable and in the context of claimant personal injury work it is already common: the fixed costs regime, "no win no fee" arrangements, the firm's own marketing outlay (which will undoubtedly in some cases be much higher than some referral fees) and the obvious desire to get paid and to maximise profits. Banning any such incentive is impossible and banning referral fees alone on this basis would perhaps be illogical, particularly if you consider that some referral fees will be cheaper than the alternative marketing costs.

7. It may even be that increased competition amongst large scale introducers of personal injury work is why a number of claims management companies and solicitor collectives now offer consumers the best funding arrangements for personal injury claims that have ever been available.⁴

8. The potential for such detriment is perhaps more likely in the context of fixed fee work such as conveyancing⁵ or wills, particularly if, for example, the flow of work were to become dominated by fee charging introducers — although this is perhaps a separate risk in the context of ensuring open competition in the legal services market.

9. In the absence of new evidence, therefore, the SRA would urge caution in assuming that referral fees increase solicitor's charges. The SRA would also stress the importance of the involvement of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in assessing the likely impact any ban would have upon competition.

That referral fees are more expensive than marketing for work directly

10. It seems unlikely that firms would pay referral fees if the work could be brought in cheaper via other means. Again, caution would therefore be prudent in assuming that such fees are more expensive than other means. In any event, this issue is perhaps only relevant if it is demonstrated that referral fees increase legal costs for the individual consumer.

That referral fees restrict access to justice

11. It is difficult to envisage how third parties having an incentive in consumers pursuing a legal matter could have a negative impact on the availability of legal services to members of the public. Caution would again be appropriate therefore in the absence of new evidence — although the impact upon competition is perhaps a separate issue which requires consideration as noted above at paragraph 9.

That referral fees are morally abhorrent

12. The SRA's consumer research does not support this, as it concluded that, as long as transparency and independence were adhered to and costs were not passed on to the client, the practice was acceptable to consumers⁶. This is perhaps unsurprising given the common presence of commission in other professional services industries⁷. Some recorded comments included⁸:

• "Not a problem. Finance companies give kick backs to car dealerships. It is understandable."
• "As long as you're not obliged, as long as you know what's happening, what's the problem with that?"

That the "up front" outlay of a referral fee is contrary to a solicitor's duty to act with independence

13. As set out above, a financial interest in a client matter is inevitable and there appears to be no reason why the payment of a referral fee "up front" would represent any more of a risk than the payment of alternative marketing expenses.

14. The SRA's view is that the most significant risk to a consumer receiving independent advice does not stem from the payment of a referral fee itself, but from the relationship with an introducer of large volumes of work generally. A lawyer's livelihood may become dependant upon the continued flow of work from an introducer, and whilst referral fees are common in such arrangements, they are not always present. One recent high profile case serves as a good example of how the risk to independence can be significant and need not relate to the payment of referral fees:

15. The miners compensation cases and others¹⁰ make it clear that the risk to independence extends well beyond arrangements where referral fees are paid (this is considered further below from paragraph 34). Fortunately in the miners' cases the SRA has had great success in enforcing solicitors' core duties (such as to be independent and to advise clients in their best interests), and has overseen the repayment of millions of pounds of compensation to clients.

16. The SRA is therefore very pleased at the breadth of the LSCP's study — to focus attention purely upon arrangements where referral fees are paid would be to misunderstand the risks posed to consumers.

Impact upon access to justice

17. The success of claims management companies and solicitor collectives in using direct response marketing mediums, such as television adverts, indicates that consumers will often respond to marketing by an intermediary rather than by looking for a local firm of solicitors. Research commissioned by the Law Society¹¹ records some support within the profession itself that:

• "Some clients find it intimidating and difficult to talk to solicitors. Claims management companies are more approachable and talk to clients in "their own language"."

18. There can be little doubt that intermediaries help raise awareness of consumer rights and put consumers who might not otherwise have pursued a matter in touch with lawyers. If a ban on referral fees were to be successfully enforced then the likelihood is that consumer litigation costs would drop, but perhaps only to the extent that fewer consumers would access justice. Whilst "access" itself may potentially not be impacted upon (as lawyers/appropriate funding arrangements would remain), the actual incidence of "access" would undoubtedly drop dramatically. There is therefore an argument to be made that completely banning referral fees would not be consistent with the legal services regulatory objective¹² of "improving access to justice"¹³.

Impact upon consumer choice of lawyer

19. While no specific data is available, the SRA's experience has been that introducers tend to restrict the client's choice of firm to a panel. Obviously the payment of referral fees increases the likelihood of an introducer insisting that a client use a particular firm.

20. Negative impact is perhaps most likely to occur where a client has purchased legal expenses insurance or is paying for legal fees as part of a broader agreement with an introducer. Clearly some clients will prefer to use a local or known firm. Often, however, the consumer is in effect faced with an ultimatum: use the introducer's panel firm or lose the benefit of the legal expenses insurance purchased, for example. This practice remains common among legal expenses insurers, although the Court of Justice (then the European Court of Justice) appears to have called the practice into question¹⁴.

21. It is worth noting, however, that for many clients access to a panel provides perhaps a greater choice than they would have otherwise had.

22. Express restrictions on choice of lawyer are, however, at least made clear to the consumer where an issue as to choice arises. In other scenarios it is more difficult to identify and address the transparency of referral arrangements. The SRA's view, informed by consumer research¹⁵, is that the transparency of the referral arrangement is vital. Consumers may assume that referrals to a particular law firm are made as a bona fide recommendation. If a firm is being recommended in return for a fee, or there is some other consideration taking place, then the SRA believes that clients should be made aware of this. Otherwise, consumers are unable to make a truly informed decision about who is best to assist them with their particular legal matter.

23. The SRA's existing provisions require transparency on the part of the firm and the introducer. However, this means that the SRA is relying upon the firm to ensure that a third party (that is not regulated by the SRA) is making the appropriate disclosure. This is an onerous burden for the solicitor and enforcement can be resource intensive, particularly as many introducers such as estate agents and trade unions¹⁶ are not as actively regulated. It would be far preferable if transparency were to be adopted and enforced as a principle applying to any third party making a referral to a lawyer.

Impact upon quality of legal advice

24. In terms of positive impact, the SRA has seen examples of introducers whose relationship with a panel firm has helped to improve the service levels offered to clients.

25. However the potential negative impact upon quality of legal advice has been a long held concern, specifically with regard to the payment of referral fees. Research commissioned by the Law Society¹⁷ indicates that solicitors themselves, including those who pay referral fees, acknowledge that referral fees can have a negative impact upon the quality of services provided. This particular research study suggests that firms have extended their use of unqualified staff to maintain acceptable profits, and that some members of the profession consider this to have had a negative impact upon the quality of the legal services provided. Similar concerns are raised that the lack of face-to-face contact common in many referral arrangements also has a negative impact upon the quality of services provided to clients.

26. Whilst service standards may in some instances be so poor as to constitute professional misconduct, the SRA's focus in its monitoring and supervisory role is on compliance with professional obligations. Under current arrangements, service matters which fall short of misconduct will generally have been investigated and assessed by the Legal Complaints Service (LCS) which makes awards to consumers for inadequate professional services. However, assessing complaints data is difficult as it is not always clear as to whether or not a referral fee has been paid in any individual complaint matter.

27. The SRA shares the concern that spiralling referral fees could pose a significant risk to the quality of services provided to consumers, and considers that the potential for negative impact upon quality of legal services as a result of referral fees being too high is a legitimate concern and risk. The SRA would be keen to explore with the LSB and the LSCP how further research might assist going forward.

Impact upon the overall costs incurred by the consumer

28. The Accident Group (TAG) scheme, the old Claims Direct (CD) scheme and the miners' compensation cases have had perhaps the most significant detrimental impact upon consumers to date, in the context of referral arrangements. An example was detailed at case study 1 above (Raleys) in terms of the miners' compensation cases but it is also worth considering the detail of the TAG and CD schemes.

29. The TAG, old CD and miners cases illustrate the potential for consumers to incur potentially substantial costs which, but for the referral arrangement, the consumer would not have incurred.

30. It is significant that the compensation arrangements of TAG, old CD and those applying to miners' compensation cases were created at a time when referral fees were banned, and that a lack of transparency was a common and significant problem. Instead of charging one referral fee to panel firms, TAG and CD appear to have inflated the client's legal costs in a series of confidential agreements in order to receive payment. Once the veil had been removed, the consumer suffered significant irrecoverable deductions from their compensation award. This business model was not uncommon at the time²⁸. It is worth contrasting this type of arrangement with the more transparent arrangements which have developed since, where intermediaries have charged their fees to the firm direct.

31. However, whilst increased transparency assists, the potential for consumer detriment has certainly not ceased. Lord Justice Jackson observed continued deductions from client damages in personal injury claims during his 2009 review of the civil litigation costs system. In his final report he commented²⁹:

"The practice is, in my view, even more abhorrent when the referrer not only demands a referral fee from the solicitor but also takes a slice of the claimant's damages (without having added any value to the case)."

32. The SRA continues to encounter arrangements where specific introducers charge fees direct to the client which are not an ordinary cost of pursuing the legal matter. Whilst the best-publicised problems have arisen in the context of consumer litigation, the SRA has also seen evidence of referral arrangements in conveyancing matters which display the same concerning characteristics.

33. The SRA has had considerable success in enforcing the solicitor's duty to advise the client independently³⁰ and in the client's best interests but the risk of additional costs being passed on to consumers in referral arrangements remains significant. The SRA would welcome the opportunity to discuss the ongoing issues in this respect further with the LSB and the LSCP as this review progresses.

Impact upon independence of legal advice

34. The potential for additional costs to be passed on to the consumer during the course of a referral arrangement increases the importance of lawyers offering independent advice to the consumer (see case studies 1-3 above) on how to pursue their legal matter. However, as set out above, the relationship between the firm and the introducer can in some instances conflict with the solicitor's duties. So, a profitable stream of work might be available to a firm but only if, for example, a percentage of the client's award is paid to the introducer³¹. The issue is illustrated well by a member of the profession in the Law Society research conducted by Moulton Hall:

• "The important thing for the client, in my view, is Rule 1 [the core duties]. In other words that solicitors act independently at all times and that the retainer is not interfered with. That is the one that is difficult to comply with in my experience in the market at the moment...If they [claims management companies] start saying to us, "We'll do this, do that, do the other. We'll simply terminate the relationship. Is everybody like us? No. That's where the problem starts"."

35. Generally speaking the incidence of breaches of the core duties by firms who operate referral arrangements is not widespread³². In the miners cases, however, the SRA found that approximately one third of the firms investigated deducted monies from the client's compensation award in addition to receiving their costs in the matter - an approach which the Tribunal has viewed to not be in the best interests of the client. In those instances where problems do arise, the impact upon consumers can be significant and widespread - particularly if a small number of firms deal with a high volume of cases, as was the case in the miners' compensation claims.

36. There is also a broader risk that a firm may become so entwined with an introducer of work that they can no longer operate as an independent law firm³³. Looking to the future, this issue will be addressed to a degree by establishing a regulated framework for third party ownership of law firms.

Key area of investigation b) Feasibility and effectiveness of possible consumer safeguards, such as consumer education, disclosure, consent, standardised referral arrangements or a cap on referral fees

The consumer risks

37. It is perhaps worth summarising the demonstrable and potential risks of referral arrangements (though not necessarily referral fees) identified above:

• receipt of independent advice — demonstrated by numerous cases and a concern which is supported by consumer research;
• additional costs being passed on to the consumer by an intermediary — similarly demonstrated by numerous cases and supported by consumer research;
• restriction on choice of lawyer — a well known aspect of many referral arrangements;
• the potential for impact upon quality of legal advice — whilst less evidence is available in this respect, there is an inevitable risk of the quality of legal services dropping if overheads such as referral fees spiral;
• the potential risk to open competition — if the flow of work in any particular area becomes dominated by referral fees then there is a risk that legal fees could go up and that local firms could become more difficult to find.

Banning referral fees

Background

38. Prior to 2004, Rule 2(3) of the Solicitors Introduction and Referral Code banned the payment of referral fees or other rewards by solicitors in return for receiving work, by stating:

• "Solicitors must not reward introducers by the payment of commission or otherwise"

39. At the time of relaxing the ban, there were two key concerns:

• enforceability — in practice it was very difficult to differentiate between fees for bona fide services such as marketing and "rewards" disguised to appear legitimate (note for example the number of hidden commissions paid to TAG in case study 2 above); and
• impact upon the open market — the OFT raised questions as to whether the ban was anti-competitive.

40. In the years leading up to the relaxation, there was growing support that the ban which was then in place should be replaced by "catch-all" provisions which cover all scenarios, including marketing and other costs, whether it be:

• a relaxation which allows such fees subject to transparency requirements; or
• a ban on a payment of any kind to an introducer.

41. In terms of the second scenario, there were obvious concerns. It would perhaps be illogical to allow a firm to advertise on television and to operate a call centre itself but to ban that firm from retaining a specialist third party to do so on its behalf.

42. In the end the Law Society Council (rule making power has since been delegated to the SRA Board) resolved to adopt the first option, and solicitors are now permitted to pay referral fees in most instances, subject to complying with a number of requirements such as transparency.

Reverting to a ban

43. Looking to the future, if there were to be a return to a ban then the SRA would now be in a stronger position to enforce, for the following reasons:

• the SDT now has the power to issue unlimited fines;
• the SRA has extended powers of investigation and in particular is now able to obtain a court order to obtain disclosure of relevant information from a third party, such as an introducer; and
• the SRA has been successful in demonstrating that deliberate attempts to organise arrangements so as to evade regulatory detection could constitute dishonesty³⁴.

44. However, it cannot be emphasised strongly enough that the resources and reform needed to successfully enforce a ban of referral fees would be enormous. There are five issues to consider:

• the number of solicitors using referral arrangements — in the 2008/2009 practising certificate renewal exercise 2,031 firms declared that they used referral arrangements (more than one in five);
• the number of referral arrangements which could be in use by any one firm — precise data is not available but generally speaking firms using such arrangements seem to make use of more than one referral arrangement³⁵. There are well over one thousand claims management companies trading³⁶ alone and in addition to this we know that many insurers, trade unions, estate agents, property intermediaries, financial services claims companies and others also operate various schemes which involve the referral of work to solicitors firms;
• some introducers are effectively unregulated and there is a lack of consistent principles across existing regulators in the context of referral arrangements - it is very difficult for one regulator alone to enforce provisions in respect of referrals of business, particularly where such provisions impact upon introducers beyond the normal "regulatory reach"
• the question of whether a fee in a particular arrangement constituted a "reward" would remain difficult — it would require research and analysis on a case by case basis; and
• there would undoubtedly be a return to secretive schemes where introducers seek payment and profit - it is perhaps naive to think that thousands of introducers, many of whom have been in business since before the relaxation in 2004, would simply end their existing practices if a ban were to be re-introduced.

45. There would be thousands of different referral arrangements which ultimately would need to be analysed and assessed. The time and expense of effectively monitoring this number of arrangements (including applications to Court for third party disclosure) would clearly be substantial, particularly if there remains a lack of consistent regulation of those receiving referral fees.

Targeted regulation

46. Even if a ban were to be successfully enforced, such intervention would not appear to target the most significant risks posed to consumers such as the risk of incurring additional costs. In fact, there is a strong argument to be made that a return to a ban will see an increase in schemes which lack transparency and pass increasingly significant costs on to the consumer.

47. Overall therefore, whilst the SRA is committed to enforcing any cross-sector provisions in respect of referral arrangements, a return to a simple ban without any other reforms may not address the risks posed to consumers and may in fact increase such risks.

A cap on referral fees

48. The benefit of a cap would be that:

• it would address the potential risks of spiralling referral fees (as noted above); and
• it would be possible to define "referral fees" or "reward" in "catch-all" provisions (to include marketing fees, etc) and so improve clarity and prospects of enforcement (although the volume of arrangements requiring assessment would remain problematic).

49. If such a cap were to be put into place however it would perhaps be sensible to differentiate between introducers who actively market for clients (often at substantial cost) and introducers who use an existing relationship (at little or nominal cost). Otherwise a cap may prevent firms from outsourcing their marketing or initial contact services.

50. Similarly though, this approach alone would not address the most serious risks posed to consumers by referral arrangements.

51. In order to address these risks (assuming that the risks posed justify cross-sector intervention at all), a prohibition or cap would also be needed in respect of any additional charges made to clients in respect of pursuing a legal matter by the introducer. The SRA currently has provisions in place for solicitors working with introducers in personal injury claims which provides for such targeted protection to a degree, but the existing provisions are under review. The SRA would welcome discussion on how a cross-sector approach in consumer litigation (or even in legal services generally) to this issue could better address the significant and demonstrable risks posed.

Consumer education and transparency

52. The consumer section of the SRA website shows information for consumers on what to expect from a solicitor, which includes information on referral arrangements. There is an obvious difficulty, however, in attempting to educate each and every consumer on an issue which will, more likely than not, never arise in their lifetime.

53. The SRA's approach, informed by the consumer research mentioned earlier in this paper, is to ensure that the arrangements are transparent and that the introducer and the firm explain to clients the relevant issues on a case by case basis.

54. The SRA's view is that transparency of referral arrangements is crucial. It is anticipated that the current moves by legal services regulators toward introducing outcomes focused regulation will help to better equip consumers to make informed choices in the context of referral arrangements.

Standard referral arrangements/documentation

55. The SRA has given consideration to the use of standard agreements/letters in the past and feels that there could be benefit in such an approach. It should be stressed, however, that the most serious consumer risks go well beyond the form of the documentation used. The existing provisions on referral arrangements are under review as part of the SRA's move toward introducing outcomes focused regulation, and it remains interested in the benefits of using standard documentation once the format of the outcomes focused provisions have become clear.

Approving referral arrangements case by case

56. Approving referral arrangements case by case — whether for the purposes of monitoring a ban, a cap or transparency - would no doubt prove successful but there are serious resource difficulties due to the sheer number of arrangements in operation within the legal services market.

57. However, case by case approval might be feasible in the context of a cap. For example, regulatory provisions could be put in place to allow arrangements where the fees to the firm / client are within prescribed limits, but if any other fee is charged then approval from the relevant regulatory body would be required. At that stage an assessment could be made of the arrangement which (a) checks that the cap is not being circumvented, and (b) checks that improper costs are not being passed on to the client.

58. Clearly, such a step would need to be justified in the public interest. However, the benefit of such an approach is that it would address the clear and substantial consumer risks posed by referral arrangements, whilst minimising the risks and issues inherent in a ban and the resource implications of attempting to approve all arrangements.

The introduction of alternative business structures (ABSs)

59. It is perhaps difficult to align a ban on referral fees with the current move towards introducing non-lawyer ownership of law firms. There is, however, a reasonable argument to be made that the ABS scenario should be distinguished from referral arrangements, in that ABSs will be subject to specific regulatory checks and balances. In any event, the SRA feels that any proposed intervention regarding referral arrangements should be carefully considered in the context of the developing ABS regime.

The way forward

60. If intervention of any kind is proposed then, as a minimum in order to ensure consumer protection and enforceability of the relevant provisions, the SRA would expect that:

• a common approach be applied to all legal service providers;
• a common approach be applied to anyone who, in the course of their business, refers a client to another party who provides legal services, at least as far as the referrals of business to lawyers is concerned (exemptions such as that for Trade Unions under the Compensation Act 2006 should be removed); and
• common principles critical to the consumer interest are enforced, namely:
• the ability of a lawyer to advise on the legal matter and how to pursue it remains independent and unfettered;
• the transparency of such arrangements is ensured; and that
• additional costs are not passed on to consumers.

61. In terms of what form such an intervention should take, whilst the options explored above each carry merit, pursuing one such approach alone would be unlikely to address all the consumer risks posed. Provisions (whether it be legislation or cross sector provisions required by the LSB) which provide for a holistic approach would be far more likely to achieve the desired outcomes. For example:

• capping fees paid by firms (distinguishing between areas of work and fees for marketing services undertaken and "pure" referral fees);
• prohibiting or capping to a nominal fee any additional charges to the client direct by an introducer in respect of their legal matter;
• requiring approval for any arrangements which involve any fee or consideration other than those permitted (with published guidelines setting out the approach to manage expectations and volume); and
• requiring regulation and enforcement of common principles (as set out above) across all sectors and markets without exception.

62. Such an approach would allow for the continued benefit to the consumer in terms of access to justice while setting out an enforceable framework for managing the risks posed to consumers³⁷.

63. Whatever steps are proposed, it is vital that any potential intervention into current arrangements is justified by demonstrable risks to the regulatory objectives set out within the Legal Services Act 2007. The SRA's current provisions seek to manage the clear risks posed in terms of solicitors but it is acknowledged that a cross-sector and cross-market approach could reap considerable benefit — particularly in furthering the protection afforded to consumers. The SRA Board has confirmed that a return to a ban on solicitors paying referral fees alone is not appropriate and the SRA looks forward to working with the LSCP, the LSB and the government in debating further any cross-sector proposals.

Notes

1. Most recently by Lord Justice Jackson in the opening paragraph of Chapter 20 Referral fees, from "Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report" (PDF 2.53MB) 2009.
2. Research conducted by Frontier Economics for the Association of British Insurers dated January 2009 suggests that on average defendants pay only 70% of the claimant client's overall costs bill after negotiation/assessment.
3. the Civil Procedure Rules Part 44.4(2)
4. Consumers are able to pursue claims through some intermediaries without paying any money "up front" for legal fees and without having any deductions made from their compensation award. This is a significant improvement - see, for example the case studies 2 and 3 later in this document.
5. Note that personal injury and conveyancing are generally accepted to be the most common areas of work where referral arrangements are used.
6. "Consumer views and their experiences on using solicitor services and their awareness of the Solicitors Regulation Authority" (May 2008). It should be noted however that views were polarised before an explanation of the process was provided.
7. Financial advisers, for example, commonly receive commission, subject to complying with certain requirements, including transparency provisions
8. "Consumer attitudes to referrals"; - report for Solicitors Regulation Authority prepared by Sidekick Research November 2007.
9. Barber and others— Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (case 9698-2007)
10. see for example Reed — Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (case 9703-2007)
11. "Referral arrangements and legal services (PDF 369K)"; - research report, Moulton Hall Market Research (para 6.2.1)
12. section 1 Legal Services Act 2007
13. It is relevant that the LSB's 2009 consultation "Alternative business structures: approaches to licensing (PDF 782K)" identified improving consumer awareness as a desired outcome in terms of "access to justice".
14. Case C-199/08, Eschig
15. as detailed above at paragraph 12
16. Trade unions are exempt from authorisation by the Claims Management Regulator under the Compensation Act 2006.
17. "Referral arrangements and legal services (PDF 369K) " — research report, Moulton Hall Market Research
18. Taken from paragraph 210 of the judgement in the Accident Group test case "Sharratt and London Central Bus Co and Others" [2003] EWHC 9020 (Costs) (Tranche 2 issues).
19. illustrative estimates on the basis of the TAG test cases judgement referred to above
20. paragraphs 147 to 149 of the Tranche 2 TAG test cases judgement referred to above
21. this appears to be the case from the Tranche 2 TAG judgement
22. paragraph 44 of Tranche 2 sets out the type of commission being paid to TAG in this respect
23. illustrative figures only
24. illustrative figures only
25. illustrative figures only
26. taken from evidence given in the Claims Direct Test cases Tranche 2 issues [2003] EWHC 9005, paragraph 53
27. Claims Direct test cases Tranche 1 issues [2002] EWHC 9002 (Costs)
28. See also No win, no fee, no chance by James Sandbach and published in 2004 by the Citizens Advice Bureau which details the Bureau's experience from that time of significant deductions in personal injury claims. It notes that "In other cases, the compensation has not even been adequate to cover the cost of the [litigation funding] loan, leaving clients in debt".
29. para 412 of Chapter 20 of "Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (PDF 2.53MB)" 2009
30. see, for example, the decision of the High Court in Beresford and Smith [2009] EWHC 3155 (Admin)
31. see, for example, Tilbury (SDT 9880-2008)
32. Data considered by the SRA Board in December 2008 indicated that evidence of a breach of the duty to be independent and the duty advise a client in his or her best interests arose in approximately 8% of the firms visited for assessment of their referral arrangements.
33. SDT Reed 9703-2007 is of note
34. Beresford and Smith [2009] EWHC 3155 (Admin)
35. Declarations from the 2008/2009 Practising Certificate renewal exercise indicates that some firms make use of hundreds of referral arrangements, although the median average was 2 per firm.
36. according to data taken from the Ministry of Justice's Claims Management Regulation review (PDF 368K) 2008/2009
37. Although separate consideration may need to be given to clarifying the position on the extent to which legal expenses insurers can restrict the client's choice of firm under the policy.